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PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appeal from the Ruling on Appeal made by Douglas
L Cornaby, District Judge presiding, in the District Court of
the Second Judicial District in and for the County of Davis,
State of Utah; and Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the
Ruling on Appeal in the Utah Court of Appeals in and for the
State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
The court below affirmed the verdict and judgment of
the trial court.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict

and judgment of the trial court, to-wit:

The District Court

of the Second Judicial District in and for the County of Davis,
State of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Reversal of conviction and restoration of costs.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The officers in this case each gave different opinions
as to the strength of the odor of alcohol on the petitioner's
breath during the interrogation/arrest stages of this case in
that Sergeant Kennepohl, the first officer to contact the
petitioner, said that he finally got a fairly strong odor when
the petitioner had opened the trunk of his vehicle (T-23),
while Officer Slater said it was a medium odor (T-52) and

Officer Schilling stated it was a faint odor - and he was
close to the petitioner and was the same height (T-8R).
Petitioner Olson was deprived of his liberty on
the morning of October 13, 1985, at approximately 2:00 a.m.,
when Sergeant David Kennepohl took him into custody and turned
him over to Officer Randy Slater for interrogation pertaining
to the accusation of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol
(T-24) .
Petitioner Olson was interrogated without the right
to counsel, and the evidence collected and testimony obtained
was used against him to obtain a conviction the crime of
Driving While Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquor and
Drugs, in violation of 41-6-44 of the Clearfield City Code, a
Class B misdemeanor.

That at the time and place aforesaid

(on October 13, 1985, in the City of Clearfield, County of
Davis, State of Utah), the petitioner did operate and/or
have actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this
State while under the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, to
a degree which rendered the defendant incapable of safely
driving said vehicle (T-7) (Information and Verdict).
Petitioner Olson was first observed by Sergeant
David Kennepohl at approximate 1:50 a.m., while Kennepohl
was Northbound at 1500 South in Clearfield, Davis County,
Utah (T-16).
Sergeant Kennepohl was on SR-126, the main highway
that runs from Layton to Sunset through Clearfield, Utah (T-26).
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The posted speed is 45 miles per .hour (T-16,17).
The road conditions were dry (T-16).
Sergeant Kennepohl stated that he first observed
the Olson vehicle when it pulled off the right-hand side of
the road going Southbound on a four-lane highway (T-16).

He

then stated that the Olson vehicle made a "U" turn and headed
Northbound from about 1150 South; he stated that as he began
to catch up, the Olson vehicle accelerated (T-17, T-27).
Kennepohl stated he could not say for sure whether
the Olson vehicle came to a complete stop (T-17).

He also

stated that Mr. Olson, upon completing the "U" turn, went
from the outside lane to the inside lane (T-17).

He also

stated that Mr. Olson was riding the yellow line with his
left rear wheel (T-17).

Sergeant Kennepohl said he observed

the left rear wheel over the yellow line from a distance of
two or three blocks some distance back (T-18).
that the lines were clear (T-18)o

He stated

He said he actually

observed the wheel over the yellow line in certain places
(T-18).

He also stated that there were no street lights

where the "U" turn was made (T-19).
Sergeant Kennepohl said he started to catch up to
Mr. Olson at 200 South because Mr. Olson had stopped for a
red light (T-19).

Sergeant Kennepohl stated that as he

approached Mr. Olson at 200 South, the light turned green
and Mr. Olson accelerated at a high rate of speed, and that
as he went through 300 North, he was doing 60 miles per hour
and Mr. Olson was going even faster and was still pulling
away from him (T-19).

Sergeant Kennepohl then said that he

turned on his overhead lights while going 60 miles per hour
in downtown Clearfield, Utah, with light traffic, and did
not turn his siren on for an additional two blocks at 500
North, and that Mr. Olson came to a full stop at 650 North
where he had stopped at a red light at the intersection (T-19,
T-20).

Sergeant Kennepohl said he was never able to get

close enough to the Olson vehicle to pace it (T-19).
Sergeant Kennepohl asked him for his drivers
license (T-21).
(T-22).

He told Kennepohl it was in the trunk

Mr. Olson went to the trunk, opened it with a key,

looked in the trunk, and then said that the bag was not
there (T-22, T-35).

Kennepohl said he did not notice whether

he had more than one key or if he had shut off the ignition
and removed the key from the car (T-35).
Kennepohl said at the time Mr. Olson was at the
trunk, he smelled a fairly strong odor of alcoholic beverage
on his breath (T-23) and noticed that his eyes were a little
glassy (T-23).
Kennepohl said Mr. Olson was coherent (T-23).
Kennepohl asked for a registration, and Mr. Olson got in the
car to find it (T-23, T-24).
Sergeant Kennepohl turned the scene over to Officer
Slater and told him it was a good possibility (T-25).
Sergeant Kennepohl said he notified Officer Slater
that he was following a possible DUI when he was at 700
South (T-30).

Sergeant Kennepohl said that the only thing
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that made him think that he had a possible DUI was the
increased speed and the riding of the yellow line (T-30).
Officer Slater was the designated DUI investigation officer for the Clearfield City Police Department (T-42)
but had received no advanced training (T-42, T-74, T-75).
Officer Slater asked Mr. Olson to perform certain actions
which included oral statements to be made by Mr. Olson in
response to questions and instructions given by Officer
Slater before he was told he had a right to counsel or that
he could not be compelled to give evidence against himself
during custodial interrogation by Officer Slater.

Officer

Slater requested Mr. Olson to perform and answer questions or
make statements during the performance (T-4 5).
Officer Slater told Mr. Olson his license would be
taken from him if he took the chemical test (T-75).

Officer

Slater also told him it would be taken away if he refused to
take the chemical test (T-69, T-70, T-71).
Officer Slater told Mr. Olson he would like him to
submit to a chemical test, and Mr. Olson agreed to take the
test (T-54).
Officer Slater put handcuffs on Mr. Olson and put
him in his patrol car (T-50).
On October 13, 198 5, Mr. Olson was released on
bail.

On October 18, 1985, Mr. Olson was arraigned before

the Honorable Alfred C. Van Wagenen, Clearfield Circuit
Court Judge, on charges of DUI, Speeding, and No License
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in Possession, to which Mr. Olson plead "not guilty" to all
of the charges.
The trial was held on January 23, 1986, where Mr.
Olson was convicted of the single charge of Driving While
Under the Influence of Intoxicating Liquors and/or Drugs, in
violation of 41-6-44 of the Clearfield City Code.
Mr. Olson appealed his conviction to the Second
District Court, but his attorney would not help him do so.
He hired a new attorney, and he also refused to attend oral
arguments and left Mr. Olson without counsel at a critical
stage of his appeal.
Mr. Olson applied for an extension of time in which
to obtain new counsel, but his motion was denied by District
Judge Douglas L Cornaby on April 17, 1986, and the oral
arguments were held without counsel present for Mr. Olson.
On May 30, 1986, Judge Cornaby entered a Ruling on
Appeal affirming the judgment and verdict of the trial court
and returned the file to the Clearfield Department of the
Fourth Circuit Court with instructions to execute the sentence,
Mr. Olson informed the Clearfield Circuit Court
that he was making an appeal to the Supreme Court of Utah,
and he then tiled a Notice of Appeal with the Davis County
District Court and delivered a copy of it to the Clearfield
Circuit Court; he was told by Circuit Court Judge Van Wagenen
that he did not have anymore rights to appeal and that the
sentence would be executed.
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Mr. Olson is raising the same issues on appeal in
the Supreme Court that he raised in the District Court.

They

concern the denial of due process of law, denial of counsel at
critical stages of the case, and being compelled to give
evidence against himself in the absence of counsel, including
oral or verbal statements, and was forced to file his own
appeal because counsel refused to help him, prejudice by the
trial court judge in regard to his refusal to plea bargain
to a lesser charge of Reckless Driving, evidence should have
been excluded that was included which prejudiced the jury,
and essentially compelled the defendant to testify against
himself by means of a surreptitious recording while he was
interrogated while under arrest, and denied the benefit of
counsel.

The jury was composed of a juror who could be

challenged for impartiality because of a death in his family
caused by a drunk driver.
The surreptitious recording was only partially
introduced as testimony of the defendant and prejudiced the
jury.

Petitioner was denied access to the trial tapes and, in

particular, he could not review the Police Department's
surreptitious tape in preparing for his appeals herein
because it was transmitted with the record but was sealed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioner Olson was deprived of his Constitutional rights to counsel, trial by an impartial jury, from
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being compelled to give evidence against himself in the
absence of counsel, and his evidence so taken was used against
him to convict him of a crime he did not commit, by use of
unlawful and un-Constitutional means.
The petitioner has a right to counsel under the
provisions of both the Constitution of the United States and
the Constitution of the State of Utah, and such counsel was
denied at critical times and stages of his in-custody/under
arrest interrogation, and virtually all of the evidence
presented against the petitioner was obtained from his own
mouth while in such custody, and he was not allowed to have
counsel before making the decision to have to submit to a
chemical test in a situation where he was told by the interrogating officer that if he took the test, he would lose his
license and if he refused €o take the test, he would lose his
license, and it was based on the fact that he was threatened
with the loss of his license based on either decision he made
and that he was not allowed to have counsel before making
the decision, and before he was given his rights under the
Miranda rule.

Even after he said he would not answer ques-

tions without an attorney present or give evidence against
himself, he was denied his rights to remain silent and have
the assistance of counsel in making that critical decision.
He was convicted before trial regardless of what choice he
made.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT AND DISTRICT COURT BOTH
COMMITTED ERROR BY RULING THAT EVIDENCE
REGARDING APPELLANT'S GIVING EVIDENCE
AGAINST HIMSELF IN ABSENCE OF COUNSEL WAS
ADMISSIBLE WHEN HE HAD NOT BEEN ALLOWED
COUNSEL BEFORE OR AFTER HE WARNED OF HIS
RIGHTS. THE EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
EXCLUDED. THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS HAS
DECIDED AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN BUT SHOULD BE SETTLED
BY THIS COURT.
Article I, Section 12, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah provides that no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law.

The

petitioner was so deprived of his liberty without due process
of law and was held to answer for a crime without his right
to counsel being present at every critical stage of the prosecution.

The Utah Supreme Court ruled in Hunter v. Dorius,

23 Utah 2d 122, 458 P.2d 877 (1969) as follows:
Driver was held not to have refused
to submit to test where he was informed of his rights and the consequences of his refusal at 9:48 o'clock
but could not reach his attorney until
shortly after 10 ofclock at which time
he consented, but by then the police
officer refused to perform the test.
Further, along this line the Kansas Court of Appeals
ruled in State v. Bristor, 682 P.2d 122 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984)
as follows:
The administration of a blood alcohol
test is a "critical stage" in the
prosecution of a DUI case and the
defendant must have the opportunity
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to consult with an attorney as to
whether to take the test or not. However, the right to counsel is a limited
right. The defendant cannot be allowed
to abuse the right in a manner which
would unduly delay or unreasonably
interfere with the administration of
the test.
In the Sites v. State case, 481 A.2d 192 (Md. Ct.
App. 1984), the court ruled as follows:
Chemical test is a "critical stage"
and defendant is entitled to consult
with an attorney before deciding
whether or not to submit to a chemical
test as long as such attempted communication will not interfere with the
timely administration of the test.
POINT II
THE RESPONDENT, CLEARFIELD CITY, IS CLEARLY
IN DEFAULT IN THE FOLLOWING REGARDS:
1.

They did not appear for oral arguments.

2.

They did not file a Plaintiff-Respondent's

Brief.
POINT III
ONE MALE MEMBER OF THE JURY AT THE
CLEARFIELD CIRCUIT COURT STATED HE HAD A
MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY KILLED BY A DRUNK
DRIVER. THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN
IMPARTIAL JURY.
POINT IV
THE ARRESTING OFFICER TESTIFIED AT THE
TRIAL UNFACTUAL STATEMENTS AS FOLLOWS:
1.

That he saw the rear tire of the vehicle over

the line on the highway from a distance of approximately three
blocks to a quarter of a mile from the petitioner's vehicle,
which is impossible.
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2.

That the petitioner was speeding from where

the officer said he first saw petitioner to where officer
stopped him.

If the officer was going 65 miles per hour, as

he stated and the petitioner was going the speed limit, they
would have come together where the officer stopped the
petitioner.
3.

That there was a well lighted area, with a

street light on each corner, where the field sobriety test
was administered.
CONCLUSION
The petitioner in this case was deprived of his
Constitutional right to due process of law under both the Utah
and the United States Constitution and was put in the untenable position of being compelled to be a witness against
himself and to give evidence against himself without first
having the benefit of counsel and was not given equal protection of the law and was deprived of his liberty by persons
acting in violation of the Constitution of the United States
and of the Constitution of the State of Utah, and compelled
evidence from him and denied him counsel at critical stages
of the prosecution and also by a judge in the appeal of the
case so that the petitioner was left to his own imagination
and devices in order to perfect his appeal to the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah.

The conviction should be

reversed, and the petitioner should be compensated for his
fine and time in which he was deprived of his liberty.
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The petitioner hereby respectfully requests that
this Court grant him a one-year extension of time within which
to perfect a proper Brief and within which to demand a
responsive Brief from the respondent herein, and for the
further reason that petitioner intends to properly present
the following facts in said Brief:
1.

Being denied equal protection of the law.

2.

Illegal reading of my Miranda card rights.

3.

Failure of Officer Von Collins to appear in

court for testimony.
4.

Violation of my Sixth Amendment rights, due to

inadequate, incompetent, and unethical counsel.
5.

Illegal sentencing.

6.

Judge was prejudice.

7.

Juror was prejudice.

8.

Fact tape that was obtained into evidence should

have been totally excluded or totally admitted.
9.
10.

No access to tape before trial.
Field test Officer Slater used to determine I

was driving under the influence has no scientific validity.
11.

Question qualification Officer Schilling has in

giving mystagmas test.
12.

Before Officer Slater asked petitioner to take

mystagmas test, he did not inform petitioner he had the right
to remain silent and the right not to incriminate himself, and
the right to an attorney before petitioner answered any questions.
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13.

Implied consent law which is civil in nature and

separate from criminal charges.
14.

Denied request that the testimony regarding

questions beyond Officer Slater asking petitioner to take
mystagmas test be restricted.
15.

Officer Slater did not advise petitioner

depending on his performance in the tests that he may be
allowed to drive away from the scene.
16.

Tape was taken without petitioner's knowledge

surreptiously, and that poses an unfair advantage.

Peti-

tioner clearly, from the very beginning, asked for an attorney
to be present.

Officer Slater subsequently asked petitioner

if he was going to answer questions even after the officer had
been fully advised that petitioner did not intend to answer
any questions without an attorney.
17.

Judge reason for allowing tape as evidence for

the reason that the officer did not continue in any way to
ask questions.

Tape should have been excluded.

Officer Slatter

did continue to ask questions about the DUI.
18.

Officer Slater refused to get petitioner's

medication after arrest that petitioner took daily.

Officer

Slater put petitioner in a life threatening situation.

This

medication was in the petitioner's car, and he informed Officer
Slater of same.

He was disabled with a bad heart and needed

three medications each day.

Officer was informed that peti-

tioner was sick at that time and needed his medication and
Cepotacal mouthwash was in the front seat of petitioner's car.
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19.

Petitioner was totally cooperative until point

after arrest and Officer Slater had refused to get petitioner
his three medications that he took daily, which medications
were in petitioner's car with his name and the Veterans
Hospital written on the label.
20.

The Davis County Jail refused to seek medical

attention or let the petitioner see a doctor, and he was held
over 18 hours without a phone call permitted him for five hours.
21.

Officer Kennepohl was without observing any

reason to assume petitioner was driving under the influence
or anything of that sort and not to assume petitioner drunk,
and should have not involved seven officers to involve him.
22.

Prosecution burden proving beyong a reasonable

doubt had a blood alcohol content of .08 percent or greater
by weight.

Prosecution had no proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

23.

On impound, why was not all medication and alcohol

impounded as evidence?
24.

Officer Slater stated unfactual statements under

oath numerous times during trial.
Respectfully submitted this 4th day of September, 1987.

FRANCHOT OLSON,'PETITIONER
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I personally delivered the
following on this 4th day of September, 1987:

Four copies

of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari (with one
bearing my original signature) to STEVE VANDERLINDEN,
Clearfield City Attorney, attorney for respondent, 140 East
Center Street/ Clearfield, Utah? and ten copies of the
said Petition for Writ of Certiorari (with one bearing my
original signature) to the Utah Supreme Court Clerk's
Office, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.

'RANCHOT OLSON
n Propria Persona
'etitioner
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Timothy M. Shea
Clerk of the Court
Utah Court of Appeals

Clearfield City,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication)

v.
Franchot Olson,

Case No. 860290-CA

Defendant and Appellant.
Before Judges Billings, Davidson and Garff
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Franchot Olson appeals his conviction of
driving while intoxicated, in violation of a Clearfield City
Ordinance. His appeal was submitted to the Court on
appellant's brief only because respondent failed to file a
brief. R. Utah Ct. App. 26(c) and 29(c).
Appellant argues that he was compelled to give evidence
against himself by taking field sobriety tests without his
attorney being present, in derogation of his rights under the
fifth and sixth amendments of the U.S. Constitution. We have
examined this contention and consider it to be wholly without
merit. Salt Lake Citv v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983);
cf. American Fork Citv v. Crosarove, 701 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1985);
Caveness v. Cox. 598 P.2d 349, 354 (Utah 1979); see also. South
Dakota v. Neville. 459 U.S. 553 (1983); Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Nor was the admission of his
refusal to submit to alcohol breath test a violation of
defendant's right against self incrimination. Sandy Citv v.
Larson, 51 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1987).

We have also considered the other contentions that are
suggested in appellant's brief, but are not properly argued,
and find each one equally without merit•
The conviction is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Richard C. Davidson, Judge

R. W. Garff, Judge

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM DECISION by depositing the same in
the United States mail/ postage prepaid to the following:
Franchot L. Olson
145 North 4th West
Logan, UT 84321
Steve Vanderlinden
Clearfield City Attorney's Office
133 South State
Clearfield, UT
84015
Honorable Douglas Cornaby
District Court Judge
City and County Building
Farmington, UT
84025
DATED this 5th day of August, 1987.
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Karen Bean
Case Management Clerk

